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ABORTION AND SELECTION
Elizabeth Oltmans Ananat, Jonathan Gruber, Phillip B. Levine, and Douglas Staiger*
Abstract—Abortion legalization in the early 1970s led to dramatic
changes in fertility. Some research has suggested that it altered cohort
outcomes, but this literature has been limited and controversial. In this
paper, we provide a framework for understanding selection mechanisms
and use that framework to both address inconsistent past methodological
approaches and provide evidence on the long-run impact on cohort
characteristics. Our results indicate that lower-cost abortion brought about
by legalization altered young adult outcomes through selection. In partic-
ular, it increased likelihood of college graduation, lower rates of welfare
use, and lower odds of being a single parent.
I. Introduction
THE legalization of abortion in the United States in theearly 1970s represents one of the most important
changes in American social policy in the twentieth century.
This policy change had obvious implications for the likeli-
hood of giving birth in the case of an unintended pregnancy,
and resulted in a drop in birth rates. In addition, we will
demonstrate that it led to a rise in pregnancy rates. As a
result of both of these changes, abortion legalization may
have altered the characteristics of birth cohorts. In particu-
lar, children’s outcomes may have improved on average,
because they were more likely to be born into a household
in which they were wanted.
Two earlier papers have investigated the implications of
such positive selection through abortion for the quality of
cohorts born after abortion legalization, but have used
different sources of variation that, implicitly, relied on
different aspects of the selection process. Gruber, Levine,
and Staiger (GLS, 1999) examined the living circumstances
of children, and focused on the reduction in births caused by
initial legalization. Donohue and Levitt (DL, 2001) exam-
ined crime among youths,1 focusing on differences in abor-
tion rates between states after legalization.
This paper builds on those results by considering the
impact of abortion access on a broad array of cohort char-
acteristics in adulthood. Since the relevant cohorts were
born in the early 1970s, children born at that time are now
in their thirties. Using the 2000 Census, we can examine
adult characteristics, such as completed educational attain-
ment, employment, and poverty status.
Beyond evaluating outcomes in adulthood, this paper also
makes important contributions by addressing the inconsis-
tent methodological approaches and the implicit models of
selection used in past research. The approach of GLS used,
as motivation, that (i) after five states repealed anti-abortion
laws in 1970, relative birth rates fell in those states; (ii) after
the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, birth rates converged be-
tween early legalizing states and other states. They treated
these two changes as a two-part experiment in reducing the
rate at which unintended pregnancies translated into births.
DL, on the other hand, noted that (i) abortion rates contin-
ued to rise after 1973, and that (ii) the abortion rate re-
mained persistently higher in the early legalizing states even
after widespread legalization. They used these diverging
trends in the abortion rate as a measure of variation in the
overall level of selection into pregnancy and birth.
In this paper, we note that the post-1973 combination of
(i) converging birth rates and (ii) persistent differences in
abortion rates implies that in the latter half of the 1970s
increased abortions did not map perfectly into fewer births.
Instead, it must be the case that pregnancy rates rose in early
legalizing states relative to other states in the late 1970s.
Since the approaches used by GLS and DL rely on different
changes in reproductive behavior, they are not equivalent.
We introduce a comprehensive model of selection that
identifies the two distinct mechanisms—increased pregnan-
cies and decreased births—by which abortion access may
alter cohort characteristics. We argue that in the first part of
the decade, decreased births in early legalizing states, out of
a steady number of unwanted pregnancies, were the domi-
nant force in the selection process. In the late 1970s, on the
other hand, we argue that a larger pool of pregnancies in
repeal states, from which a steady number of births were
selected, means that early legalizing states could continue to
have more positively selected cohorts of children even after
widespread legalization.
We test this model empirically by using a methodology
that incorporates both the legalization variation used by
GLS and the variation in “taste” for abortions across states,
which DL relied on implicitly, to credibly identify selection
effects. We find evidence of selection effects of abortion on
young adult outcomes. In particular, lower costs of abortion
led to an increase in the rate of college graduation, lower
odds of welfare receipt, and lower odds of being a single
parent. We are unable to sharply distinguish the mechanisms
through which selection occurs, but our results are robust to
the empirical methodology employed.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section II gives back-
ground on abortion legalization and reviews previous work
on its effects. Section III provides a model of the mecha-
nisms through which abortion affects selection of birth
cohorts. Section IV describes the methodology for our
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study. Section V discusses the data. Section VI presents the
results. Section VII concludes.
II. Background
As detailed elsewhere (Garrow, 1994), abortion was first
legalized in five states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, New
York, and Washington) in 1970, three years ahead of the Roe
v. Wade decision in 1973. Levine et al. (1999) used this
state-level variation in the timing of legalization to show
that births fell considerably in response to the law change.
GLS, using this birth rate variation, determined that abor-
tion legalization improved outcomes for those born in the
early repeal states in the 1971–1973 period, relative to other
states, and that this relative improvement faded afterwards.
Estimating the characteristics of those children who would
have been born had abortion not been legalized (the “mar-
ginal” child), they found their outcomes would have been
worse than the average outcomes of those children who
were born. The marginal child would have been 40% to
60% more likely to live with a single parent, to be poor, to
be in a household collecting welfare, and to die during the
first year of life.
DL hypothesized that, if fewer unwanted children were
born when abortion rates increased, then crime may have
decreased when those children would have reached adult-
hood.2 Among other methods, they regressed state/year-of-
birth arrest rates against the abortion rate in the state and
year in which an individual was born. They concluded that
increased abortion access in the 1970s may explain as much
as half of the decline in crime observed in the 1990s.
The DL study has generated a great deal of controversy.
Critiques by Joyce (2004a, 2004b) and Foote and Goetz
(2008) have raised important questions regarding the em-
pirical analysis, to which Donohue and Levitt (2004, 2008)
have responded. Although it is beyond the scope of this
paper to fully elaborate upon all the points raised in this
debate, we do want to focus on Joyce’s criticism of their
identification strategy. He argues that including the abortion
rate on the right-hand side of the regression does not
accurately gauge variation in unwanted births, since the
abortion rate is endogenous, and only the variation in
legalization is exogenous. Joyce reestimated the Donohue
and Levitt model using the double quasi-experiment imple-
mented by Levine et al. (1999) and GLS and obtained
results that he argued were inconsistent with a causal inter-
pretation.
Donohue and Levitt disputed this reading of Joyce’s
findings, however, and highlighted a potential weakness of
the GLS identification strategy: abortion rates do not corre-
spond well to the “experiment” proposed by GLS. This is
illustrated in figure 1, which plots the differences in birth
rates and in abortion rates between repeal states and nonre-
peal states from 1965 to 1979.3 Changes in birth rates
correspond well to a natural experiment: birth rates in repeal
states fell relative to nonrepeal states in 1971, but the gap
disappeared by the mid-1970s once abortion was legalized
nationwide. However, abortion rates do not follow this
pattern. The figure imposes a zero difference in abortion
rates prior to 1970, due to data limitations; in 1971, the first
full year in which abortion was legal in all repeal states,
abortion rates in those states jumped dramatically compared
with the rest of the country (note that the abortion rate
becomes nonzero in nonrepeal states as well, since women
could travel to repeal states to obtain an abortion). While
this first divergence in abortion rates corresponds well to the
experiment proposed by GLS, it never dissipated, contrary
to the assumptions of the two-part experiment. Instead,
women in repeal states continued to use abortion at much
higher rates than women in the rest of the country through-
out the 1970s, suggesting that differential selection may
have continued as well.
III. A Model of Selection
To distinguish the different ways that abortion access may
lead to selection, we introduce a theoretical model that
describes the potential effects of changes in the cost of
abortion. This simple model of decision-making under un-
certainty is closely related to those introduced by Kane and
Staiger (1996) and Levine and Staiger (2002), which were
designed to examine how changes in abortion cost would
affect fertility decisions of a woman facing uncertain payoff
to giving birth. We extend that here to explicitly incorporate
heterogeneity across women in the expected payoff to
2 We are aware of two other contributions to the literature on abortion
and children’s outcomes other than crime. Charles and Stephens (2006),
using methods similar to GLS, find that legalized abortion led to a
significant reduction in drug use. Pop-Eleches (2006), exploiting a sudden
ban on abortions imposed in Romania, finds that, conditional on mother
characteristics, children born after the ban had worse economic outcomes
as adults. 3 The data used to generate this figure are described subsequently.
FIGURE 1.—DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REPEAL AND NONREPEAL STATES IN THE
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giving birth, to allow for an additional margin of selection:
selection into pregnancy.
A. A Simple Model
We begin by briefly summarizing our assumptions re-
garding the decision-making process. First, a woman makes
her decision about pregnancy based on the expected payoff
that she anticipates at the time of becoming pregnant; this
expected payoff varies across women. Second, a woman
makes her pregnancy and abortion decisions sequentially;
she first chooses whether to become pregnant (ex ante), and
then after some time has elapsed she chooses whether to
abort or give birth (ex post). Third, a woman makes her ex
post decision about abortion after updating her expected
payoff of giving birth, because by the time of the abortion
decision she is better informed about the consequences of a
birth than she was at the time when she chose to become
pregnant. Thus, in our model, abortion differs from other
methods of avoiding a birth (such as contraception or
abstinence) because the abortion decision is made with
more complete information than the pregnancy decision.4
Finally, we assume that children’s outcomes are directly
linked to the payoff of giving birth. Intuitively, we assume
that more “wanted” (that is, higher payoff) births have better
outcomes than less wanted births.
The formal details of the model are presented in Ananat
et al. (2006), but the main implications are intuitive. Within
this simple model, lowering the cost of abortion affects
fertility decisions on two margins. First, more women will
become pregnant because the down-side risk of a pregnancy
is less costly should they want an abortion after becoming
pregnant. These women are essentially paying a price (the
potential abortion cost) to buy the option to give birth after
they have learned more about the birth payoff. The preg-
nancies that are added on this margin we refer to as
“marginal pregnancies.” The average payoff to births that
result from these marginal pregnancies will be lower than
that for nonmarginal pregnancies, corresponding to the fact
that women with marginal pregnancies are indifferent about
getting pregnant ex ante, while all other women strictly
prefer pregnancy ex ante. Thus, all else equal, the addition
of marginal pregnancies will increase the number of births
but lower the average outcome of births.
Lowering the cost of abortion will also affect fertility
decisions on the abortion margin ex post. Among the
women who become pregnant, lowering the cost of abortion
will increase the probability of abortion and reduce the
probability of birth. The births that are eliminated on this
margin we refer to as “marginal births.” The payoff to these
marginal births will be lower than that for all other births,
corresponding to the fact that women with marginal births
are indifferent between having an abortion and giving birth
ex post, while all other women strictly prefer giving birth ex
post. Thus, all else equal, the elimination of marginal births
will decrease the number of births but raise the average
outcome of births.
B. Empirical Implications of the Model
Figure 2 illustrates the implications of this model for
pregnancy and birth rates. On the right-hand side of the
diagram, where the cost of abortion is very high (for
example, abortion is illegal), no women will choose to abort
and all pregnancies will end in a birth; in other words,
Pr(birthpregnancy)  1 and Pr(pregnancy)  Pr(birth).
Lowering the cost of abortion will increase the pregnancy
rate (through the addition of marginal pregnancies) and will
reduce the proportion of pregnancies that end in a birth
(through the elimination of marginal births by abortion).
Thus, lowering the cost of abortion will unambiguously
increase the number of pregnancies and abortions.
However, since these two increases work in opposite
directions, the net effect of lowering the cost of abortion on
the birth rate is ambiguous. We have chosen to draw figure
2 so that lower costs result in a lower birth rate until costs
become very low, at which point the birth rate flattens out.
This would be the case if relatively few marginal pregnan-
cies are induced until the cost of abortion becomes quite
low; for example, women are unwilling to become pregnant
in hopes of receiving positive news about the payoff to a
birth unless abortion is very low-cost.
Figure 3 uses figure 2 to provide a possible explanation
for why birth rates in repeal and nonrepeal states diverged
from 1971 to 1973 but then converged by 1976, while
abortion and pregnancy rates remained divergent through-
out the 1970s. In the 1960s (we use 1965 as an example),
the cost of abortion, A65, was very high in all states. Then,
from the 1960s to the early 1970s (such as 1972), the cost
of abortion fell dramatically in the early repeal states (to
AR,72), while the costs fell only modestly in the nonrepeal
4 In fact, there is considerable evidence that information obtained after
becoming pregnant (for example, support from parents or the father, health
problems of mother or fetus) is an important determinant of the abortion
decision (Bankole, Singh, & Haas, 1998; Torres & Forrest, 1988).
FIGURE 2.—RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COST OF ABORTION AND PROBABILITY
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states (to AN,72), partly due to travel to the repeal states for
abortion. From the early to mid-1970s (such as 1976), the
cost of abortion continued to fall in both sets of states,
through legalization in the nonrepeal states and increased
access in the repeal states. This led the costs to move to
AR,76 and AN,76 respectively. Such a difference in abortion
costs between states even when abortion is universally legal
could result from differences in the social acceptability of
the procedure, for example, which could lead to lower
access to abortion providers or generalized stigma against
the procedure.
This set of changes is consistent with the empirical
evidence from figure 1, as well as other evidence that
abortion costs were lower in repeal states. Birth rates post-
1976 looked similar despite differences in abortion rates,
and our model offers as explanation that the greater number
of terminated “marginal births” in the repeal states was
cancelled out by the greater number of “marginal pregnan-
cies” that were subsequently carried to term. If this is
accurate, then birth cohorts in repeal states would be made
up of fewer marginal births and more births from marginal
pregnancies. Since the payoffs to marginal births are lower
than payoffs to all other births (including those resulting
from marginal pregnancies), cohort “quality” in repeal
states would then continue to improve relative to that in
nonrepeal states in the mid- to late 1970s.
To summarize, our model suggests that cohort quality
improves under two circumstances. If marginal births are
reduced with little or no change in marginal pregnancies,
then cohort quality will rise. This is what likely occurred at
the time of initial abortion legalization. But cohort quality
may also rise if, holding cohort size steady, pregnancy rates
rise so that selection into the cohort increases. This is likely
what took place in the years after abortion legalization.
IV. Empirical Methodology
Two empirical approaches have been used to document
the relationship between abortion access and child outcomes
in a state-year birth cohort. Both approaches run regressions
in which the dependent variable is the average outcome in a
birth cohort and include a comprehensive set of controls.
One approach (GLS) uses an IV regression of the average
outcome in a birth cohort on the log birth rate in the state
and year of birth, instrumenting for the birth rate with
changes in the legal status of abortion within a state. A
second approach (DL) uses an OLS regression of the aver-
age outcome in a birth cohort on the ratio of abortions to
births in the state and year of birth. In this section we
propose a more general empirical framework that encom-
passes both approaches as special cases and that separately
estimates the impacts of the marginal birth and the marginal
pregnancy.
A. Specification
The equation estimated by GLS took the following form:
ln OUTCOMEst
 1  ln BIRTHRATEst controls εst.
(1)
The dependent variable, OUTCOMEst, is a measure of the
average outcomes of those born in state s in year t. For
simplicity, we define all outcomes so that they reflect lower
socioeconomic status of the cohort (for example, the pro-
portion of the cohort living in poverty or the proportion that
did not graduate from college). The key explanatory vari-
able, ln(BIRTHRATEst), is the log birth rate to childbearing-
age women in the cohort’s birth year and state. The equation
includes generic controls for the otherwise unobservable
FIGURE 3.—IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROBABILITY OF PREGNANCY AND BIRTH, GIVEN THE LIKELY COST OF ABORTION IN REPEAL (R) AND
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characteristics that differ between states or over time, in-
cluding state and cohort dummies, quadratic trends by state
of birth, and controls for economic and demographic con-
ditions in the state and year of birth.
Taking the derivative of equation (1) with respect to the
log birth rate shows that 1 is an estimate of the gap
between the outcome for the marginal birth and the “aver-
age birth” (defined in the model as the expected payoff to
birth from an average pregnancy) in the cohort, stated in
percentage terms.5 Our theoretical model suggests that 1
should be positive; the marginal birth is more likely than the
average birth to live in poverty, not graduate from college,
and so forth.
In the context of our model, equation (1) imposes an
important restriction by not acknowledging the potential
role of the marginal pregnancy. An increase in pregnancy
and abortion rates that leaves the birth rate unchanged, as
seen in figure 1, cannot affect the average outcome of the
birth cohort according to this specification. Equation (1)
implicitly assumes that outcomes are the same for the
marginal births that are avoided due to legalization and the
marginal pregnancies that occur after legalization, while our
theoretical model suggests that outcomes of marginal preg-
nancies will be better than those of the marginal births they
are replacing. This is a potential problem for the identifica-
tion strategy used by GLS.
A more general specification estimates the impacts of the
marginal birth and marginal pregnancy separately:
ln OUTCOMEst 1  ln PREGRATEst
 2  ln BIRTHRATIOst
 controls εst.
(2)
The variable PREGRATE is the number of pregnancies per
childbearing-age woman in the cohort’s birth year and state,
and BIRTHRATIO is the births to pregnancies ratio. Using
the same argument that led to the interpretation of 1, 1 is
an estimate of the difference in outcomes between births
resulting from the marginal pregnancy and births resulting
from the average pregnancy, while 2 is an estimate of the
difference in outcomes between the marginal birth and the
average birth.6 This specification illustrates that GLS im-
posed 1  2, that is, that the marginal pregnancy and the
marginal birth had the same outcomes. Our theoretical
model, however, suggested that outcomes from the marginal
birth should be worse than the outcomes for the marginal
pregnancy, that is, 0  1  2 for a negative outcome such
as living in poverty.
Interestingly, equation (2) also includes the specification
run by DL as a special case. To see this, note that one can








The final expression in equation (3) is the abortion ratio,7
the variable used by DL.8 Thus, equation (2) can be approx-
imately rewritten as




DL estimated this equation restricting 1  0. Their restric-
tion implicitly assumed that the birth outcome for the
marginal pregnancy was the same as the outcome for the
average birth.
Thus, the difference between the DL and GLS specifica-
tions rests on which restrictive assumption each made about
the birth outcomes of the marginal pregnancy. In the more
general specification of equation (2), the impacts of the
marginal birth and marginal pregnancy are estimated sepa-
rately, and the assumptions maintained in earlier papers can
be tested directly.
B. Estimation
Estimates of equation (2) by OLS will be biased if
much of the variation in pregnancy rates and birth ratios
was not the result of changes in the cost of abortion. GLS
instrumented for the birth rate using variation in the legal
status of abortion across states, because variation in the
birth rate was potentially driven by factors other than the
cost of abortion, such as transitory economic improve-
ments or unobserved improvements in the expected out-
come of births. GLS also estimated reduced-form models
using this specification:
5 See GLS for this derivation.
6 Note that we measure 2 using the birth ratio, rather than the birth rate,
because this specification estimates the effect of a change in births holding
the pregnancy rate constant, that is, the birth ratio. When we move to
two-equation versions of this specification in equations (6) and (7), we
will use the more intuitive birth rate.
7 Note that this calculation proxies pregnancies with the sum of births
and abortions, implicitly making the standard assumption that miscar-
riages are exogenous. We continue this assumption in the empirical
estimates that follow.
8 DL refer to the ratio of abortions to births as the abortion rate, but the
abortion ratio is the conventional name for this statistic. The abortion rate
typically refers to abortions performed per 1,000 women of childbearing
age.





where Repeal is a dummy variable for states that are early
repealers of abortion restrictions; D7173, D7475, and
D7679 are dummies for the eras 1971–1973, 1974–1975,
and 1976–1979; and controls are as above. This model
serves to examine whether any gap in outcomes that
emerged in 1971–1973 across these groups of states closed
afterward when abortion was legal everywhere. That is, if
abortion legalization improves average cohort outcomes
through selection, then cohort outcomes should improve in
the repeal states in 1971–1973 (	1  0, since outcomes are
negative), but then “catch up” in other states after 1973 (	2,
	3 
 0).
While GLS used legalization alone as an instrument for
the cost of abortion, the trends in figure 1 suggest that even
after national legalization there continued to be differences
in abortion cost between repeal and nonrepeal states; in-
deed, as we describe below, such differences exist even
within the set of nonrepeal states. DL used these differences
in estimating the relationship between outcomes and the
abortion rate by OLS, implicitly assuming that abortion rate
variation was driven by changes in the cost of abortion.
Instead of relying on such an assumption, we extend the
GLS instrumental variables strategy to explain heterogene-
ity in the cost and use of abortion across states and years
beyond legalization.
We extend the set of instrumental variables used to
predict abortion costs along two dimensions. The first di-
mension is the travel distance to the nearest state in which
abortion was legal during the period after early repeal and
before national legalization (1970–1973).9 The second is the
“latent cost” of abortion in each state after national legal-
ization. Legalization loosened a constraint on abortion de-
mand, but there was variation across states in the extent to
which the constraint had been binding; in places with high
latent costs, abortions would not be heavily demanded even
if legal. Such latent costs could be a function of many
factors, but certainly an important one is social attitudes
toward the use of abortion: higher social opprobrium on
abortion use raises its psychic cost and reduces its use. In
the states where abortion carries greater social stigma, we
expect abortion rates to be lower after legalization.
The notion that social norms matter is strongly supported
by our data. Figure 4 plots abortion rates in repeal and
nonrepeal states over time, dividing the nonrepeal states into
two groups: “socially liberal” states with at least 22% of the
population reporting they were “liberal” in opinion polls
from the 1960s, and “socially conservative” states with less
than 22% “liberal.”10 Seven of the nonrepeal states fall into
the liberal category. As can be seen in figure 4, repeal states
had the highest abortion rates after 1973. Abortion rates
were lowest in socially conservative states, while socially
liberal nonrepeal states were in the middle.
We therefore include in the first-stage equation for the
pregnancy rate the interactions between repeal status and
year dummies, which were used as instruments by GLS, as
well as additional interactions with travel distance and latent
cost of abortion to capture the heterogeneity of abortion cost
within nonrepeal states after legalization:
ln PREGRATEst
 D7173 Nonrepeals  	1  	2LCs  	3DISTs
 D7475 Nonrepeals  	4  	5LCs
 D7679 Nonrepeals  	6  	7LCs
 controls εst.
(6)
Nonrepeals is a dummy for a cohort born in a nonrepeal
state; era dummies are defined as above; DISTs is the
average straight-line distance from state s to the nearest
repeal state; and LCs is a measure of latent cost of abortions
(operationally defined below). Both DIST and LC have been
rescaled so that they range from 0 to 1:0 represents a state
with the lowest distance (the repeal states) or the lowest
latent cost (New York), and 1 represents a state with the
highest distance (Louisiana) or highest latent cost (Missis-
sippi). All of the repeal states have a distance of 0 and latent
cost near 0, so there is no need to include interactions
between repeal and these variables in the specification.
Similarly, all states have a distance of 0 after 1974, so there9 The notion that travel costs matter for abortion access is intuitive and
is supported by the work of Levine et al. (1999) and Kane and Staiger
(1996). Both papers find that the birth rate is affected by distance to the
nearest legal state (in the 1970–1973 period) or to the nearest abortion
provider (thereafter).
10 The opinion data that were used to identify conservative and liberal
states are described subsequently.
FIGURE 4.—TRENDS IN ABORTION RATE PER 1,000 WOMEN AGE 15–44 IN
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is no need to include distance interacted with D7475 or
D7679. The main effects of distance, latent cost, and repeal
status are all absorbed by the state of birth fixed effects.
We hypothesize that the coefficients on all three interac-
tions with D7173 should be negative (	1, 	2, 	3  0), since
higher costs of abortion should reduce pregnancy rates.
After abortion is legalized in all states, we expect that
women in states that had the highest latent costs were the
least likely to have an abortion, implying that 	5  0 and
	7  0. Controlling for latent cost, we expect the difference
in abortion costs between nonrepeal and repeal states to
decline during the transition years 1974–1975, as abortion
providers gradually entered these states following Roe (im-
plying that 	1  	4  0). We expect no difference in
abortion costs, other than that driven by latent costs, be-
tween nonrepeal and repeal states after 1976 (	6  0).11
Conceptually, the cost of abortion is a single variable that
is being used to instrument for two different variables,
leaving equation (2) unidentified. However, our model sug-
gests that changes in abortion cost may have nonlinear
effects that will differ between the two endogenous vari-
ables, and our set of instruments provides identification by
capturing this nonlinearity. We hypothesize that going from
illegal abortion to legal abortion with high latent cost may
have a large effect on the birth ratio but little effect on the
pregnancy rate (because the abortion option is so costly);
thus legality is a plausible instrument for the birth ratio. In
contrast, going from high latent cost to low latent cost may
have a much larger relative effect on the pregnancy rate, as
the down-side risk of a pregnancy is all but eliminated; thus
social liberalism is a plausible instrument for the pregnancy
rate.
In practice, results based on this approach were impre-
cise. As a result, we estimate each of the following equa-
tions (which represent restricted versions of equation (2)
that are consistent with past models) separately, using OLS
as well as the full set of instruments just described:
ln OUTCOMEst
 1  ln BIRTHRATEst controls εst.
(7)
ln OUTCOMEst
 1  ln BIRTHRATIOst controls εst.
(8)
Equation (7) is identical to equation (1), and represents a
restricted form of equation (2) in which 1  2 (the
marginal pregnancy and the marginal birth have the same
outcomes, analogous to GLS). Equation (8) is very similar
to equation (4), but imposes the restriction that 1  0 (the
birth outcome for the marginal pregnancy is the same as the
outcome for the average birth, analogous to DL).
Although these restrictions make it impossible to test the
full implications of the model, these specifications allow us
to bound the true difference between the marginal birth and
the average birth (2 in equation [2]). Equation (7) leads to
an overstatement of the difference between the marginal
birth averted by abortion and average birth because it attributes
all cohort selection to the change in “net births”; it ignores the
fact that an increase in the number of marginal pregnancies
carried to term that is offset by a decrease in marginal births
from unwanted pregnancies will also improve selection despite
having no effect on the birth rate.12 Equation (8), meanwhile,
leads to an understatement of the difference between the
marginal and average birth by ignoring the fact that the
newly induced marginal pregnancies that are carried to term
will tend to lower the average birth outcome.13 Thus, while
we cannot estimate equation (2), we are nonetheless able to
bound the true selection effect for the marginal birth.
V. Data
To estimate these models we use several different sources
of data. Our main source is the 2000 decennial Census of the
United States.14 We use it to measure a variety of outcomes
for individuals born in a given state/year: whether the
individual lives in a household that is below the poverty
line, is receiving welfare, or is a single parent; whether the
individual dropped out of high school, or did not graduate
from college; whether the individual is incarcerated;15 and
whether the individual is not employed. The Census pro-
vides two important advantages over other data sets con-
taining similar outcome measures. First, it identifies state of
birth rather than merely state of residence. If migration from
one’s childhood state is related to other outcomes, then state
of residence will be a biased measure of abortion availabil-
11 The first-stage equation for the birth ratio is analogous to equation (5),
except that the expected signs of the coefficients in this equation are the
opposite of the pregnancy-rate equation (since higher abortion costs
reduce pregnancies but raise the birth ratio).
12 This is a direct application of omitted variable bias. To see this, rewrite
equation (2):
Outcomest 1  2 ln PREGRATEst 2 ln BIRTHRATEst
 controls εst,
since ln BIRTHRATE ln PREGRATE ln BIRTHRATIO.
Omitting ln(PREGRATE) from this produces equation (6). According to
our model, 1  2  0 and cov (PREGRATE, BIRTHRATE)  0, so the
omitted variable bias is positive. Since 2  0 for negative outcomes, this
overstates the coefficient on ln(BIRTHRATE).
13 This is also a direct application of omitted variable bias. Equation (7)
estimates OUTCOMEst  1  ln(BIRTHRATIOst)  controls  εst,
omitting the pregnancy-rate term, ln(PREGRATEst), from equation (2).
Since 1  0, 2  0, and cov(PREGRATE, BIRTHRATIO)  0, the OLS
estimate of 1 will be a downward-biased estimate of 2.
14 All Census data used were taken from the Minnesota Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series (Ruggles, Sobek et al., 2003); only unallocated
observations were used.
15 The Census only provides data on institutionalization, not incarcera-
tion per se. But past evidence suggests that the vast majority of institu-
tionalized young adults are incarcerated. In the 1980 Census (the most
recent Census that provides detailed institutionalization data), 68% of
those aged 20 to 35 who were institutionalized were incarcerated. This rate
is likely to be much higher today since incarceration rates have nearly
quadrupled (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003), while the number in
mental institutions declined (Grob, 2001).
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ity at birth. Second, it offers large sample sizes. As noted in
GLS, even large changes in the outcomes of the marginal
child will result in relatively small changes in the outcome
of the average child, which is our unit of observation. The 5%
sample provides the precision to identify these small changes.
Our sample includes those born in the United States and
observed in the 2000 Census at ages 21 to 35 in that year
(born between 1965 and 1979).16 A unit of observation
represents mean values for each state/year of birth cohort.
The means are weighted by the person weights provided by
the Census Bureau, and the cell sizes are used as weights in
the regression analysis. This data structure allows us to control
for both age and state of birth fixed effects in our model.
One drawback to the use of the decennial Census is that
we only observe each cohort once in adulthood, in the year
2000. As a result, we cannot separate age and cohort effects
within states (national age effects are captured by a full set
of age dummies). To address this problem, we allow qua-
dratic variation in age effects by state in all specifications, as
in GLS. That is, we assume that any state-specific age
patterns are captured by a quadratic trend in age, and that
any remaining differences across states by cohort reflect
true cohort effects.
We supplement Census data on cohort adult outcomes
with two measures of cohort birth circumstances in 1965–
1979: the percentage of all infants born to minors (under the
age of 18), and the percentage born to nonwhite mothers.
These measures are derived from Vital Statistics data from
the natality detail files for each year between 1965 and
1979. Vital Statistics outcomes are based on all births, and
tend to produce more precise estimates than outcomes based
on the 5% sample from the 2000 Census.
Key explanatory variables in our model require data on
abortions and births. Birth rates by year and state of resi-
dence come from Vital Statistics. Abortion rates by year and
state of residence come from the Alan Guttmacher Institute
(AGI) beginning in 1973. These data are generally regarded
as the best available since they reflect the results of surveys
of large and small abortion providers that report the counts
of abortions performed at their site. We use AGI data for
which an algorithm has been employed that converts data
arranged by state of occurrence to one in which it is
arranged by the mother’s state of residence.17 We then
augment these data with additional data reported by the
Centers for Disease Control for the period 1970 through
1972 (Centers for Disease Control, 1971, 1972, 1974).
These data, collected through the Vital Statistics system, are
believed to include some undercount of the total abortions
performed (cf. Saul, 1998), but they are the best data
available for this period. We impose an abortion rate of 0 for
years prior to 1970.18
We use three different measures of the cost of acquiring
an abortion as instrumental variables. The first is whether
the cohort was born in one of the five early repeal states
(California, New York, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii).19 The
second is the average straight-line distance to the nearest
county in which abortion is legal (calculated for each county
in a state and averaged, weighting by county population).
Distance has been rescaled to go from 0 to 1, and is 0 after
1973 and in repeal states.20 Third, we use two different mea-
sures of the latent social cost of abortion. While the ideal
variable would be a measure of tastes for abortion in the
pre-legalization period that would capture the extent to which
women were constrained by social costs when abortion was
illegal (and therefore the extent to which they might take
advantage of it upon legalization), unfortunately, such data are
not available. Instead, we use two different measures of states’
social climates prior to 1970 as proxies for this ideal measure.
Our first proxy instrument uses data on state political
attitudes compiled from 1960s state-level voter surveys
conducted by Louis Harris and Associates.21 In 38 states, at
least one Harris poll of a representative sample of voters
was conducted in 1962, 1964, or 1966 that asked the
question, “What do you consider yourself—conservative,
middle of the road, or liberal?” We use the fraction of
self-identified liberals as one measure of latent costs: where
the population is more liberal, the social costs of attaining a
legal abortion post-repeal are lower.22
Our second proxy is a measure developed by Levine
(2004) to capture illegal abortion rates by state before 1970:
in places where there was more demand for illegal abortion,
the latent costs of abortion were lower. He employs retro-
spective data from the 1982 and 1988 National Surveys of
Family Growth and estimates abortion rates by state for the
1965–1969 period (one observation for each state, aggre-
gating over years to help overcome small sample sizes).
These data suffer from recall bias and the general reluctance
to report abortions (perhaps even more so if performed
16 In models of college graduation and poverty status, we have restricted
the sample to those between the ages of 24 and 35 in 2000 (born between
1965 and 1976), because college graduation rates are very low and
poverty rates are very high for those in their early twenties, making them
difficult to capture using quadratic age trends.
17 The procedure for doing so is described in Levine (2004).
18 We have also undertaken an exercise designed to test the sensitivity of
our results to imposing abortion rates of 0 for the pre-1970 period. We
used retrospective data on illegal abortion to fill in the missing values for
the abortion rate. The results of this exercise are very similar to those reported
below, with coefficient estimates generally 10%–20% larger in magnitude.
19 We have also considered other proxies for the real costs of obtaining
abortion. One alternative measure is distance to the nearest state in which
abortion is legal; another measure is distance to the nearest county with an
abortion provider. When we replicate our analysis using either of these
variables, the results are consistent with those reported here.
20 Using AGI data on the location of counties with abortion providers, and
calculating distance to the nearest abortion provider as in Kane and Staiger
(1996), yields very similar results. Because of the potential concern about
endogenous location of abortion providers, we do not report these results.
21 Historical Harris poll data are available from the data archive of the
Odum Institute for Research in Social Science, at http://www.irss.unc.edu/
data_archive/home.asp.
22 In some later polls, the option “radical” was added to the survey
question. Respondents who identified themselves as “radical” are grouped
with those who identified as “liberal” for the purposes of our analysis.
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while illegal). Nevertheless, they provide a gauge of the
potential differences across states that may have existed in
the years prior to abortion legalization. This variable is nor-
malized to 1 in the states where no abortions were reported
during this period and 0 in the state with the most reported
abortions (so that latent abortion costs rise as the index rises).23
For each of our proxy measures, data are missing for
some states. Twelve states had no survey data on political
identification prior to 1970 and two small states did not have
pre-1970 estimates of the abortion rate. For both measures,
we replaced each missing state value with the average value
for other states in its Census region (based on the nine
Census divisions).24
In addition, to provide some controls for the state- and
year-specific environment in which the birth or pregnancy
decision was made, we use data on the economic and
demographic conditions in the state and year of birth. These
include per capita income, the crime rate, and the percent-
age of the population that was white, all from the Statistical
Abstract (various years). The insured unemployment rate
comes from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment
and Training Administration (1983).
VI. Census Results
A. Estimates Using Abortion Legalization Only
We begin our analysis by presenting results based on the
methodology used in GLS that lays out clearly the impact of
abortion legalization on key fertility outcomes, shown in
table 1. The first three columns report results for the log of
the birth rate, pregnancy rate, and birth ratio (births/preg-
nancies). Similar to Levine et al. (1999) and GLS, we
estimate that birth rates declined by 5.7% in repeal states
relative to nonrepeal states in the 1971–1973 period, but that
the gap shrunk after 1973 and had disappeared by 1976–
1979. Both the initial decline and the “catch-up” by the
nonrepeal states are strongly statistically significant. Esti-
mates for the pregnancy rate and birth ratio are quite
different. As expected, pregnancy rates increased by 12.9%
in repeal states relative to nonrepeal states in the 1971–1973
period, but there was no significant catch-up and the gap
remained at 10.9% by 1976–1979. Similarly, the birth ratio
declined by 18.7% in repeal states relative to nonrepeal
states in 1971–1973, but by 1976–1979 this gap had only
partially disappeared. Thus, while birth rates had converged
by 1976, pregnancy rates had risen and birth ratios had
fallen in repeal states relative to nonrepeal states. This
pattern follows that observed in figure 1.
In column 4 of table 1 we confirm that the fertility effects
associated with abortion legalization that we observe in
Vital Statistics data are present in the Census data roughly
thirty years later in the form of reduced cohort size. We
construct a measure that we call the “survivor rate,” which
represents the number of individuals in a state/year of birth
cohort alive in the 2000 Census per 1,000 women of
childbearing age in the state/year in which those individuals
were born. If there were no mortality since birth or, more
plausibly, if mortality since birth were small and roughly
random, then estimates using this dependent variable should
be roughly comparable to the previously estimated birth
23 Nevada has the highest reported abortion rate, but may be an outlier
due to its small sample size. Among bigger states, New York had the
highest rate, 7 per 1,000 women of childbearing age; its current (year
2000) value is 36. State of residence in the survey year is not available in
the public-use file of the NSFG. Researchers can access these data,
however, by visiting the National Center for Health Statistics and con-
ducting the analysis in their Research Data Center. For the purposes of this
project, we assign the state of residence in the survey year to the
respondent’s residence in all preceding years, as Gruber, Levine, and
Staiger (1999) have done.
24 We have also considered other proxies for latent costs that have the
advantage of greater state coverage, but the disadvantage of being avail-
able only post-repeal. These include state attitudes toward abortion itself,
measured in either the General Social Survey (which covers some states
beginning in 1972) or the DDB Needham Lifestyle Survey (starting in
1985). In addition, NARAL (2003) compiles recent state rankings of
access to abortion. Each of these measures is strongly correlated with both
the pre-1970 abortion rate and state political attitudes, and using each as
an instrument yields similar results.











Log % Born to
Nonwhite Mother
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Repeal  1971–1973 0.057 0.129 0.187 0.043 0.085 0.053
(0.012) (0.044) (0.035) (0.013) (0.020) (0.025)
Repeal  1974–1975 0.018 0.145 0.162 0.000 0.113 0.024
(0.019) (0.055) (0.041) (0.029) (0.019) (0.025)
Repeal  1976–1979 0.006 0.109 0.103 0.039 0.115 0.005
(0.023) (0.064) (0.045) (0.049) (0.026) (0.033)
Mean of dependent variable (before logs) 7.8% 8.8% 89.1% 5.3% 6.8% 17.8%
p-value for test of equality of coefficients
on repeal  1971–1973 and repeal 
1976–1979
0.00 0.40 0.00 0.04 0.22 0.01
p-value for test of joint significance of
reported coefficients
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Notes: Reported coefficients are for the repeal interactions from regression specifications such as equation (1), including the following other regressors: the insured unemployment rate, per capita income, crime
rate, percentage of the population that is nonwhite, a full set of state and year dummies, and state-specific quadratic trends. In specifications (1)–(4), 750 observations are available representing the fifty states and
fifteen years of birth cohorts (1965–1979). Specifications (5) and (6) are limited to 600 observations (1968–1979). All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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effect.25 Indeed, our estimates indicate that these con-
structed survivor rates are just over 4% lower in repeal
states relative to nonrepeal states in cohorts born between
1971 and 1973 relative to that from earlier cohorts, and not
significantly different in later years. These results mimic
rather closely those in column 1, and verify that differences
in cohort size in the 2000 data reflect the earlier impact of
abortion legalization.
The final two columns of table 1, which estimate equation
(5), document that legalized abortion resulted in selection at
the time of birth. Moreover, they provide some evidence
that the resulting gap in average characteristics of birth
cohorts did not completely disappear after 1973. The per-
centage of infants born to minors decreased by 8.5% in
repeal states relative to nonrepeal states in the 1971–1973
period, but there was no significant catch-up and the gap
remained at 11.5% by 1976–1979. The results for percent-
age born to nonwhite mothers, by contrast, are more con-
sistent with catch-up in the nonrepeal states. Thus, despite a
convergence in birth rates, some of the average character-
istics of the birth cohorts did not converge, providing further
evidence that changes in the birth rate alone are insufficient
to identify selection into a cohort.
This conclusion is supported in table 2, which reports
estimates from equation (5) of the differential patterns in
repeal and nonrepeal states in children’s outcomes as adults,
including poverty status, welfare receipt, single parenthood,
educational attainment, employment, and the likelihood of
being incarcerated.26 All outcomes are defined to be nega-
tive in terms of socioeconomic status, so selection due to
lower cost of abortion would predict a negative coefficient
on repeal  1971–1973. The coefficient on repeal  1976–
1979 should be 0 (or less negative) if there is convergence
in these outcomes following widespread legalization; lack
of convergence suggests continued differences in selection
in the late 1970s.
In most cases, the direction of the effect based on the
repeal  1971–1973 coefficient is that which would be
predicted by the positive selection found in GLS. The
results on education are perhaps most striking, with a large
negative effect on the percentage of the cohort that did not
graduate from college (column 5), indicating that abortion
legalization shifted the distribution of education upward.
But these results provide no evidence of convergence;
coefficients on repeal  1974–1975 and repeal  1976–
1979 are generally of the same sign and larger than the
coefficient on repeal  1971–1973. Again, consider the
results for college graduation. The coefficient on repeal 
1971–1973 shows that the odds of not graduating from
college fell by 2.7% in the early repeal states over the
1971–1973 period, relative to other states, but the coeffi-
cient on repeal  1976–1979 is larger yet, indicating that
the odds of not graduating from college fell 3.8% in early
repeal states even in the later period. This lack of conver-
gence supports the possibility that continued growth in both
the pregnancy and abortion rates in early legalization states
25 In fact, we know that this assumption, taken in its strongest terms, is
inaccurate. GLS show that the infant mortality rate for the marginal child
following abortion legalization was 40% higher than that for the average
child. But the infant mortality rate is so low (1.9% during that period) that
a somewhat lower rate would be swamped by the magnitude of the impact
on fertility itself.
26 In some cases, we hypothesized that the effect of parental fertility
control would be stronger on the outcome of a certain at-risk subpopula-
tion. For example, women are at much higher risk of welfare receipt,
while men and African Americans are at higher risk of incarceration. We
therefore conducted the analysis separately by sex and by race, but the
results did not differ significantly from what is presented here.
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Repeal  1971–1973 0.036 0.033 0.148 0.002 0.027 0.018 0.007
(0.044) (0.038) (0.056) (0.053) (0.009) (0.020) (0.154)
Repeal  1974–1975 0.085 0.027 0.215 0.014 0.020 0.014 0.102
(0.071) (0.058) (0.154) (0.042) (0.013) (0.035) (0.264)
Repeal  1976–1979 .191 0.008 0.177 0.018 0.038 0.016 0.295
(0.076) (0.083) (0.233) (0.050) (0.020) (0.048) (0.662)
Mean of dependent variable
(before logs)
10.3% 9.0% 2.1% 7.4% 70.6% 22.5% 4.8
p-value for test of equality of
coefficients on repeal 
1971–1973 and repeal 
1976–1979
0.00 0.64 0.88 0.83 0.44 0.32 0.58
p-value for test of joint
significance of reported
coefficients
0.01 0.39 0.04 0.69 0.01 0.24 0.50
Notes: Reported coefficients are for the repeal interactions from regression specifications such as equation (1), including the following other regressors: the insured unemployment rate, per capita income, crime
rate, percentage of the population that is nonwhite, a full set of state and year dummies, and state-specific quadratic trends. All specifications include 750 observations representing the fifty states and fifteen years
of birth cohorts (1965–1979), with the following exceptions: specifications (1) and (5) exclude 1977–1979 because percentage in poverty and percentage not college graduate increase sharply at these ages;
specification (3) excludes one observation with 0% in welfare; and specification (7) excludes fifty observations with 0 incarcerated. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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caused greater positive selection in the composition of births in
those states, even after abortion was legalized nationally and
birth rates converged.
B. Estimates Using Abortion Cost Instruments
These results motivate our updated methods for estimat-
ing selection effects based upon the model in equations (7)
and (8). Before presenting OLS and IV results from these
models, we first report the results of the first-stage regres-
sions, which relate differences in proxies for abortion costs
to the log birth rate and birth ratio. We also estimate
first-stage models where the log pregnancy rate is the
dependent variable, because of its key role in equation (2)
and because we have unambiguous predictions regarding
the impact of abortion costs on pregnancy rates.
Table 3 reports two sets of first-stage estimates, corre-
sponding to our two instrumental variables strategies; the
results are similar for both sets of instruments, and are
consistent with our predictions. Columns 1 and 4 provide
support for the prediction that higher abortion costs reduce
the pregnancy rate: nonrepeal states had lower pregnancy
rates during the 1971–1973 period; among nonrepeal states,
those with higher latent social costs of abortion (based on
pre-1970 liberalism or on the illegal abortion rate) experi-
enced lower pregnancy rates. The same pattern continues in
1974–1975 and 1976–1979. As expected, the negative rela-
tionship between latent costs and the pregnancy rate be-
comes more pronounced after legalization: once the legal
constraints are removed, the underlying latent costs of
abortion become the primary determinant. The remainder of
the table shows that higher abortion cost (as proxied by
nonrepeal, latent cost of abortion, and distance) predicts
higher birth ratios (or equivalently, fewer abortions) and
higher birth rates. The first-stage F-statistics for each of
these regressions are sufficiently large to rule out weak-
instrument problems.27
C. OLS and IV Results
Regression results based on equations (7) and (8) are
reported in tables 4 and 5, respectively. In each table, each
panel represents regressions on a different outcome. There
are three columns in each table, for OLS and our two IV
strategies. For each IV regression, we also show the p-value
for the Hausman test that OLS and IV outcomes are signif-
icantly different, and the p-value for the overidentification
test of our set of instruments.
In table 4 (where the key independent variable is the log
of the birth rate from equation [6]), the pattern of coeffi-
cients is fairly consistent with selection, with positive IV
coefficients for living in poverty, being a single parent,
receiving welfare, being a high school dropout, and not
graduating from college. The IV results are wrong-signed
(negative) for being unemployed and being incarcerated.
The results for single parenthood and college graduation are
statistically significant with either instrument, and for wel-
fare receipt are marginally significant. The findings are
similar in table 5: positive (expected sign) coefficients on
education, welfare receipt, poverty rate, and single parent-
hood; negative (wrong-signed) for being not employed and
27 IV estimation of the more general specification in equation (2)
requires instruments for both the pregnancy rate and the birth ratio. A
generalization of the first-stage F-statistic to the case of two endogenous
variables, described in Staiger and Stock (1997), indicated that our
instruments were too weak to reliably estimate equation (2). They do not
generate sufficient independent variation to reliably estimate the coeffi-
cient on each of the endogenous variables.
TABLE 3.—FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS
Latent Cost Based on Pre-1970% Liberal Latent Cost Based on Pre-1970 Abortion Rates
ln (Pregnancy
Rate) ln (Birth Rate) ln (Birth Ratio)
ln (Pregnancy
Rate) ln (Birth Rate) ln (Birth Ratio)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1971–1973  nonrepeal 0.099 0.021 0.120 0.109 0.019 0.127
(0.048) (0.014) (0.040) (0.051) (0.020) (0.043)
Nonrepeal  “latent cost” 0.031 0.061 0.092 0.021 0.035 0.056
(0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.031) (0.023) (0.030)
Nonrepeal  distance 0.027 0.018 0.045 0.010 0.023 0.033
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)












Nonrepeal  “latent cost” 0.205 0.090 0.295 0.125 0.075 0.201
(0.046) (0.030) (0.040) (0.061) (0.037) (0.055)
1976–1979  nonrepeal 0.011 0.041 0.053 0.034 0.066 0.101
(0.076) (0.031) (0.059) (0.090) (0.046) (0.071)
Nonrepeal  “latent cost” 0.267 0.079 0.346 0.176 0.076 0.252
(0.060) (0.043) (0.054) (0.069) (0.048) (0.061)
# of observations 750 750 750 750 750 750
First-stage F-Statistic 14.9 32.0 37.1 9.9 33.4 13.9
p-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Models also include the insured unemployment rate, per capita income, crime rate, percentage of the population that is nonwhite, a full set of state and year dummies, and state-specific quadratic trends.
Distance and latent cost are scaled 0–1, with 0 representing the state with the lowest cost and distance (highest pre-1970 percentage liberal or abortion rate). Standard errors and F-statistics account for clustering
at the state level.
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being incarcerated. Once again, the results for single par-
enthood, welfare receipt and college graduation are all at
least marginally significant with both instruments.
These results suggest sizeable effects of selection on
outcomes. Recall that the estimates from the specifications
in table 4 and table 5 provide a bound on the difference
between the marginal and average birth. Therefore, the
estimates in the IV columns in each table suggest that the
marginal birth is 23% to 69% more likely to be a single
parent, 73% to 194% more likely to receive welfare, and
12% to 31% less likely to graduate college.
We have also investigated the link between abortion and
crime, applying our instrumental variables strategy to the
crime data gathered by DL. The main practical improve-
ment that our approach offers relative to previous work by
DL and by Foote and Goetz (2008) is that we estimate IV
models where changes in the birth ratio and birth rate are
instrumented using changes in abortion policy. With this
approach, we found a negative but not precisely estimated
effect of reduced abortion costs on crime per capita; as with
our Census results, we were unable to distinguish between
effects due to changes in pregnancy rates and effects due to
changes in the birth ratio. Nonetheless, despite many dif-
ferences in data and method, we were able to replicate the
results in DL for total crimes committed. Therefore, our
results align with the previous literature in that reduced
abortion costs led to reduced crime, but largely through a
reduction in cohort size (total crime) rather than through
selection (crime per capita).28
VII. Conclusions
In this paper, we have extended past analyses of abortion
and selection in several dimensions. First, we have provided
a new theoretical model that provides useful insights regard-
ing the mechanisms that may cause selection when the cost
of abortion changes. The main insight of the model is that
selection may still occur even if birth rates are unaffected,
since the composition of births may change. Second, we
have introduced an econometric methodology that encom-
passes the differing approaches taken by past researchers.
Although we are unable to implement this methodology
directly due to limited power, we can identify what restric-
tions need to be imposed for the past methods to be
consistent with our theoretical model. Since our findings are
broadly consistent across these specifications, the impact of
28 Detailed results are provided in Ananat et al. (2006).
TABLE 4.—ESTIMATES OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG BIRTH RATE AND
ADULT OUTCOMES
(standard errors in parentheses)
Outcome OLS IV 1 IV 2






p-value for Hausman test 0.731 0.938
p-value for over-ID test 0.458 0.620






p-value for Hausman test 0.166 0.142
p-value for over-ID test 0.720 0.646






p-value for Hausman test 0.043 0.075
p-value for over-ID test 0.666 0.293






p-value for Hausman test 0.787 0.877
p-value for over-ID test 0.832 0.721






p-value for Hausman test 0.306 0.477
p-value for over-ID test 0.324 0.591






p-value for Hausman test 0.259 0.037
p-value for over-ID test 0.597 0.856






p-value for Hausman test 0.624 0.252
p-value for over-ID test 0.587 0.059
Notes: IV 1 represents the specification that includes state pre-1970 fraction liberal as an instrument.
IV 2 represents the specification that includes state pre-1970 abortion rates as an instrument. Models also
include the insured unemployment rate, per capita income, crime rate, percentage of the population that
is nonwhite, a full set of state and year dummies, and state-specific quadratic trends. Sample sizes are the
same as those reported in tables 1 and 2. Standard errors and test statistics account for clustering at the
state level. The excluded instruments in the IV models are those reported in table 3. For poverty and
college graduate we use only 1965–1976, so the instruments used 1974–1976 interactions, rather than
1974–1975 and 1976–1979 interactions.
TABLE 5.—ESTIMATES OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG BIRTH RATIO AND
ADULT OUTCOMES
(standard errors in parentheses)
Outcome OLS IV 1 IV 2






p-value for Hausman test 0.201 0.328
p-value for over-ID test 0.426 0.618






p-value for Hausman test 0.241 0.292
p-value for over-ID test 0.666 0.434






p-value for Hausman test 0.067 0.158
p-value for over-ID test 0.536 0.269






p-value for Hausman test 0.392 0.324
p-value for over-ID test 0.739 0.671






p-value for Hausman test 0.746 0.754
p-value for over-ID test 0.201 0.688






p-value for Hausman test 0.241 0.060
p-value for over-ID test 0.584 0.879






p-value for Hausman test 0.427 0.121
p-value for over-ID test 0.647 0.108
Notes: IV 1 represents the specification that includes state pre-1970 fraction liberal as an instrument.
IV 2 represents the specification that includes pre-1970 abortion rates as an instrument. Models also
include the insured unemployment rate, per capita income, crime rate, percentage of the population that
is nonwhite, a full set of state and year dummies, and state-specific quadratic trends. Sample sizes are the
same as those reported in tables 1 and 2. Standard errors and test statistics account for clustering at the
state level. The excluded instruments in the IV models are those reported in table 3. For poverty and
college graduate we use only 1965–1976, so the instruments used 1974–1976 interactions, rather than
1974–1975 and 1976–1979 interactions.
ABORTION AND SELECTION 135
the different restrictions does not appear to be very dra-
matic. Third, we have updated the literature on abortion and
selection to include outcomes in early adulthood. We found
consistent evidence that changes in cohort composition that
occurred in the 1970s that can be attributed to greater
abortion access led to improved cohort outcomes, particu-
larly in the form of higher rates of college graduation, lower
rates of single parenthood, and lower rates of welfare
receipt.
Most importantly, taken together with earlier results
(Gruber et al., 1999), our findings suggest that the improved
living circumstances experienced by the average child born
after the legalization of abortion had a lasting impact on the
lifelong prospects of these children. Children who were
“born unwanted” prior to the legalization of abortion not
only grew up in more disadvantaged households, but they
also grew up to be more disadvantaged as adults. This
conclusion is in line with a broad literature documenting the
intergenerational correlation in income (Solon, 1999) and
showing that adverse living circumstances as a child are
associated with poorer outcomes as an adult (Haveman &
Wolfe, 1995). Overall, our results provide further evidence
that abortion is associated with positive selection and that its
impact is persistent.
Thus, overall, we find evidence consistent with long-run
selection effects through abortion. While the statistical sig-
nificance of our findings depends on the particular outcome
under consideration, it is robust to the choice of instrument,
and the pattern is clear: when abortion costs are lowered,
cohort outcomes improve.
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